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HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE
In the relatively short history of cognitive neuroscience, which 
has inherited much of its models, paradigms, and findings from 
behavioral and cognitive psychology, MW is virtually absent 
(Smallwood and Schooler, 2006) as a subject of research. The 
reluctance in the scientific arena to study MW can be accounted 
for by its non-behavioral characteristics when compared to more 
conventionally studied mental functions: MW occurs in the absence 
of any external cue; it is often unintended and even unaware; it 
takes its own course – probably driven by internally generated cues; 
and it is hard to trace back, replicate or report. However, a recent 
paradigm shift in functional neuroimaging holds a great promise 
for the development and establishment of MW research. The dis-
covery of the “default-mode network” (DMN; Raichle et al., 2001) 
and the following realization of the significance of spontaneous 
resting-state neural activity (Raichle, 2009) dramatically launched 
a prosperous path in the scientific exploration of MW.
Default-mode network relates to a functionally meaningful neu-
ral network, which includes the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), 
the precuneus, the posterior cingulate cortex, and the inferior 
parietal and lateral temporal cortices (Figure 1). In comparison 
to other functional neural networks, DMN has unique patterns of 
activity (Gusnard et al., 2001; Raichle et al., 2001): both in terms 
of energy consumption and in terms of the blood oxygen-level 
dependent (BOLD) signal, activation levels in this network were 
shown to descend below baseline during cognitively demanding 
tasks. Moreover, this network shows high activation levels at rest 
compared to task. These activation patterns and their possible func-
tional meaning have received considerable attention in recent years, 
using independent as well as combined neuroimaging techniques 
“Thoughts meander like a
restless wind inside a letter box
they tumble blindly as
they make their way across the universe”
John Lennon
IntroductIon
Mind-wandering (MW) refers to ongoing mentation which occurs 
spontaneously, and largely autonomously, whenever an awake indi-
vidual is not engaged in a cognitively demanding task. Alternative 
names to the term “MW” (Smallwood and Schooler, 2006; Mason 
et al., 2007) in past and recent literature include “day dreaming” 
(Giambra, 1979), “task-unrelated images and thought” (Giambra 
and Grodsky, 1989), “stimulus independent thought” (Teasdale 
et al., 1995), “task-unrelated thought” (Smallwood et al., 2003), 
“incidental self-processing” (Gilbert et al., 2005), “inner speech” 
(Morin, 2009), and “spontaneous thought” (Christoff et al., 2008).
Conceptualized as a core element of what William James defined 
as the “stream of consciousness” (James, 1892), MW, in various names 
and forms, has gained considerable attention in ancient and modern 
philosophy and in theoretical psychology. The robust, autonomous, 
and continual nature of this psychological process has led writers to 
suggest that rather than being an undesired lapse of attention to the 
external world (William James remarked, when he was accused of 
being absent-minded, that he was really just present-minded to his own 
thoughts; Barzun, 1983), MW must have an important adaptive value 
for healthy cognition (Christoff et al., 2008; Baars, 2010). Yet much like 
the neural basis of MW, its adaptivity and the nature of its interaction 
with other cognitive processes remain a scientific blind spot.
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a compelling candidate for a neuro-biological account of mind-wandering, in itself a rest-based 
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into the neural basis and adaptive value of MW, a truly intriguing and unique human experience.
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doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2011.00056FIguRe 1 | Results of overviewed studies in relation to DMN regions. 
DMN-related results of studies overviewed in this review, categorized by strategy, 
superimposed on a template brain. Light-grey markings denote DMN areas (in 
accordance with Buckner et al., 2008) dorsal and ventral medial prefrontal cortex, 
lateral temporal cortices, precuneus, and posterior cingulate cortex. Strategies 
which have not been employed in neuroimaging studies (strategy A2) or strategies 
which are concerned with degree of connectivity rather than degree of activation in 
brain areas (strategy B3) are not represented in this figure.
(e.g., Ben-Simon et al., 2008). Studies with clinical populations 
shed additional light on the critical functionality of the DMN by 
demonstrating that malfunctioning of the DMN is associated with 
several neurological, psychiatric, and psychological pathologies (for 
a review see Buckner et al., 2008).
Since the first reports describing it, DMN rest-related activity 
had been suggested to comprise a neural correlate of MW (Gusnard 
et al., 2001). This proposition was based on two main features of 
the DMN: First of all, like MW, DMN activity occurs during rest 
and shows a reverse correlation with cognitive load (Mason et al., 
2007). Secondly, task-related activations in the medial prefron-
tal and parietal areas, which comprise substantial elements of the 
DMN, have been shown to occur during self-related tasks (Northoff 
and Bermpohl, 2004; Spreng et al., 2009). This has led writers to 
suggest that rest-related activations in these areas might subserve 
MW, in itself a process of self-related mentation (Baars, 2010).
With the exceedingly growing body of information on neural activ-
ity in the wakeful, resting state, the shortage in accepted modus operandi 
regarding the scientific examination of MW has become a bottle neck, 
restraining further examination of the functionality of the DMN on 
the one hand and of the neural basis of MW on the other. However, 
several pioneering attempts have been made to study the relation 
between DMN activity and MW, yielding striking results. Converging 
the solutions to the challenge of quantifying and scientifically studying 
MW presented in these studies portrays an array of potential strategies 
to address the question of a DMN–MW association.
The current review aims to facilitate the scientific exploration of 
the neural correlates of MW by overviewing existing literature and 
defining, respectively, five methodological strategies for studying 
MW within a functional neuroimaging paradigm. Two of these 
strategies include direct measurements of MW (strategies A1 and 
A2), whether in real time – during rest or task performance, or 
retrospectively. Three additional strategies (Strategies B1, B2, and 
B3) rely on theoretical assumptions regarding MW and self related 
or cognitive functioning, as well as on the known functionality 
of networks emerging from connectivity analysis performed on 
data acquired during the resting state. Through the prism of these 
five strategies, we review existing literature and findings regarding 
MW published mainly in the recent decade. Each strategy will be 
presented in light of its advantages and disadvantages as well as 
the degree of its fitting to various paradigms and data analysis 
techniques in experimental neuroimaging.
StrategIeS for StudyIng the neural correlateS of 
MInd-wanderIng
The current section overviews methodologies and results from 
a representative sample of a decade of literature, mainly func-
tional neuroimaging (PET or fMRI) studies, regarding the rela-
tion between DMN activation patterns and MW. The inclusion 
criterion for studies in this overview was that they bring forward 
the question of the relation between rest-related DMN activity and 
rest-related phenomenological experience. Importantly, studies of 
self-related functions were only included if they state a specific 
hypothesis regarding rest-related neural and psychological func-
tioning. Table 1 lists the studies presented in this review, categorized 
by strategy. A visual illustration of the results obtained by these 
studies is presented in Figure 1.
The below differentiation between indirect and direct strategies 
could also be discussed in terms of determining the dependent 
and the independent variables within a functional neuroimaging 
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time assessment of the degree of MW while others focusing on   
  post hoc questioning of subjects.
Strategy A1: real-time MW sampling
Mind-wandering can occur with or without awareness of its occur-
rence (“meta-awareness”; Christoff et al., 2009). Nevertheless, one 
can normally report if a thought was occurring in their mind or 
not, if interrupted and asked to do so at a given time point. This is 
the rational underlying the MW sampling (also known as “thought 
sampling” or “thought probing”) technique (McKiernan et al., 2006; 
Mason et al., 2007; Christoff et al., 2009; Stawarczyk et al., 2011). 
Several approaches have been introduced for MW sampling in the 
neuroimaging set up, but a typical one uses a probing tone in even 
or uneven intervals, during either a rest or a task scan; subjects are 
instructed to indicate whether they were experiencing a spontane-
ous thought (i.e., unrelated to task performance) at the time the 
tone was presented (or, in a similar version, since the previous 
probe; Giambra, 1995). In block-design neuroimaging studies, each 
scan session is then scored according to the rate of “yes” answers 
given in it out of the overall number of tones presented in the 
session. The degree of MW occurrence is found to correlate with 
degree of neural activity in the DMN, as illustrated in Figure 1. In 
ERP studies, EEG recordings adjacent to the pressings are analyzed 
separately for “on-task” vs. “off-task” reports. Using this method, 
Kam et al. (2011) demonstrated that the P1 component to a visual 
or auditory probe was reduced during off task, implying a reduc-
tion in sensory level processing during MW.
setup: in the case of the indirect strategies, cognitive load or self-
relatedness are being experimentally manipulated (i.e., independ-
ent variable) and are expected to cause a change in the measured 
neural signal of the DMN (i.e., dependent variable); in the case of 
the direct strategies, the degree of DMN activation is manipulated 
(i.e., independent variable) by altering rest and task while scanning, 
and the consequent change in the degree of MW is being assessed 
following scanning (i.e., dependent variable). Table A2 in Appendix 
summarizes typical dependent and independent variables accord-
ing to each strategy.
dIrect StrategIeS for MeaSurIng MInd-wanderIng
Strategies for directly quantifying the degree of MW represent a 
straightforward attempt to overcome its non-explicit nature, and 
essentially make conventional experimental methods applicable 
for studying it. For example, one can use the obtained degree 
of reported MW to categorize sessions or subjects into groups 
before analyzing, or to correlate it with the degree of activation 
in selected brain regions of interest or in the whole brain. The 
greatest challenge, however, is that in contrast to most behavio-
ral measurements, the actual tracking of MW, or even its mere 
verbalizing in real time, tampers with its very occurrence (Filler 
and Giambra, 1973): an individual busy with reporting her own 
MW is less free to engage in spontaneous MW comparing to when 
left to rest quietly. This can probably account for the relatively 
few studies which have attempted to directly quantify MW in 
the history of cognitive neuroscience, and possibly, for the even 
fewer methods developed to do so. Several quantifications tech-
Table 1 | A summary of overviewed studies and their DMN-related results.
Strategy/study
  Brain region/BA
  PFC  Parietal/temporal cortex
  DL  DM  VM/ACC PCC  Precuneus  TPJ
  8–10, 46  8–10  24, 32  23  7 , 31  30, 39, 40
A1. Real time MW sampling
  Christoff et al. (2009), PNAS   L  + R  R    L  L
  Stawarczyk et al. (2011), Plos One    L     L  L
A2 Retrospective evaluation of MW  Specific coordinates not reported
B1.Parametric modulation of self-relatedness
  Gusnard et al. (2001), PNAS   L  + R  L     
  Johnson et al. (2002), Brain   L  + R      L 
  Goldberg et al. (2006), Neuron  L  L L  L  + R    L
  Andrews-Hanna et al. (2010), Neuron   L  + R  L + R      L + R
  D’Argembeau et al. (2005), Neuroimage   R L     
  Schneider et al. (2008), Neuroscience  L  L L  L  
B2. Parametric modulation of cognitive load
  Wicker et al. (2003), Brain Res. Rev. L  + R  L + R  R     
  Christoff et al. (2004), Cortex  L      L  + R  R
  McKiernan et al. (2006), Neuroimage  L   L  + R  L + R   R 
  Mason et al. (2007), Science   L  L  R    L + R  L + R
B3. Data analysis of neuronal dynamics  Specific coordinates not reported
This table depicts overviewed studies sorted by strategy and their DMN-related results. Areas of DMN were chosen with accordance to Buckner et al. (2008). 
Numbers represent Brodmann areas. PFC, prefrontal cortex; DL, dorso lateral; DM, dorso medial; VM, ventro medial; P/ACC, posterior/anterior cingulate cortex; TPJ, 
temporoparietal junction.
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MW. In such a study (Gruberger et al., 2008), questionnaires for 
measuring dependent self awareness and degree of dissociation 
were applied to assess the degree of interference in MW during 
rest. The underlying hypothesis was that artificial interference with 
the normal process of MW will manifest itself as disruption in self 
awareness and as a sense of dissociation, which indeed was cor-
roborated by the results. A third noteworthy example is the Resting 
State Questionnaire (ReSQ) published recently by Delamillieure 
et al. (2010) explicitly for usage in a functional neuroimaging setup. 
The ReSQ consists of 62 items organized by five main types of men-
tal activity: visual mental imagery, inner language, somatosensory 
awareness, inner musical experience, and mental manipulation of 
numbers. Using a 0–100% scale, the participant retrospectively and 
quantitatively rates the proportion of time spent in each mental 
activity during the resting-state fMRI acquisition. Whether this 
tool will or will not eventually gain the confidence of the research 
community, its great importance lies in that it represents a pioneer-
ing effort to encompass the richness and individual nature of MW 
into a standardized questionnaire.
IndIrect StrategIeS for MeaSurIng MInd-wanderIng
Indirect strategies – strategies in which MW is not directly meas-
ured – are typically based on the conceptualization of MW as 
self-related and as more prevalent during rest than during tasks of 
high cognitive demand. The hypothesis could be framed as follows: 
if DMN neural activity during rest is the neural basis of MW, then 
DMN activations during rest and during a given task should be 
more similar when the task shares common characteristics to MW, 
i.e., is characterized by low cognitive load and high self relevance.
The advantage of the indirect strategies is straightforward: they 
avoid measuring MW directly, thus overcoming its non-quantifiable 
nature and the lack of validated behavioral MW measures. Instead, 
they use accepted task-related behavioral measures (mostly vali-
dated or previously published) and modulate their self-relatedness 
or their degree of cognitive load.
Strategy B1: parametric modulation of self-relatedness
James’s “spiritual self” (James, 1892), Gallagher’s “narrative self” 
(Gallagher, 2000), Dennett’s “non-minimal self” (Dennett, 1991), 
and Damasio’s “autobiographical self” (Damasio, 1998), are just a few 
examples of how MW is often present within theoretical models of the 
self. It is typically represented as a module of its own, distinct both from 
“lower,” more basic, senses of consciousness as well as from “higher” 
self-related executive functions. Contemporary neuro- scientists also 
tend to agree that the “stream of consciousness” is inseparable from 
the ongoing, constant, sense of self (Damasio, 1998; Gusnard, 2005; 
Beer, 2007). According to this notion, MW, whether its content is 
directly related to the thinker or not, is a self-related, self-generated, 
self-sustaining function (Baars, 2010); it serves as an integral part of 
self awareness, a pre-requisite for healthy psychological functioning.
The conceptualization of MW as a private case of self-related 
functioning produces a hypothesis for an overlap between the 
neural basis of self-related tasks and the neural basis of MW. This 
hypothesis has been translated in some studies into a rational for 
comparing neural activations during self-related tasks to neural 
activations at rest, when MW is assumed to occur most.
An interesting body of research based on this strategy examines 
the link between MW (referred to as “task-unrelated thought”) and 
errors during task performance (Smallwood et al., 2003, 2008). 
These studies demonstrate that when MW intrudes during task 
performance, and attentional lapses occur, task performance is 
impaired. Based on this line of research it may be suggested that 
MW competes with task performance on a limited capacity of 
attentional resources, in effect representing a state of “perceptual 
decoupling” (Smallwood et al., 2011a). This corresponds well with 
the idea discussed later on in this paper on the reverse correlation 
between MW and executive networks in the brain.
In yet another, less common, version of MW sampling, sub-
jects are requested to press a button each time a thought comes 
into mind (Giambra, 1989). Using this type of report, Braboszcz 
and Delorme (2010) asked subjects to press a button as soon as 
they realized their mind was wandering during a task of counting 
breaths. These presses were later used as an ERP analysis, showing 
reduced P200 responses to auditory stimuli, and reduced ability to 
identify the oddball auditory stimuli (smaller N100 during MW). In 
addition, frequency analysis showed that MW was associated with 
higher delta and theta power and lower alpha and beta power com-
pared to task performance. Despite the suitability of this method 
for ERP studies, as reported by the authors themselves, this version 
seems to be less favorable and can hardly be found in neuroimaging 
studies, probably because it imposes greater meta-awareness and 
concentration from subjects and thus interferes with the natural 
occurrence of MW.
The strategy of MW sampling presents a clear advantage of being 
a real time, direct and quantified measurement of MW occurrence. 
One should bear in mind, though, that to the best of our knowledge 
it has never been systemically tested for validity and reliability, and 
thus it is mainly justified by its straight-forwardness and intuitiveness.
Strategy A2: retrospective evaluation of MW
Mind-wandering requires peace of mind; disturbances tend to 
interrupt its natural flow. In other words, an informative report 
regarding MW at a given time period, without interfering with its 
occurrence, may better be collected retrospectively, after a session 
has ended (notably, even then, the contents of MW is not always 
straightforwardly accessible to memory). Surprisingly, though, 
designated structured psychological questionnaires for explicitly 
assessing MW in healthy individuals are scarce. The very few exam-
ples which can be found in the literature (Giambra, 1979; Klinger 
and Cox, 1987; Matthews et al., 1999) did not seem to survive the 
transition from psychological behavioral research to neuroscience. 
Consequently, and unfortunately, there is no accumulated body 
of literature regarding the neural basis of MW, and virtually no 
experience in the field obtained by retrospective questioning of 
MW using validated experimental instruments designated for 
this matter.
One inspiring study which could be considered an example for 
this approach is a PET study by D’Argembeau et al. (2005). In this 
study subjects had to rate the total amount of thoughts experienced, 
whatever their content, using an in-house developed questionnaire 
immediately following scanning (a similar approach is found earlier 
in Mcguire et al. 1996). An alternative to using in-house developed 
questionnaires is to use established questionnaires of experiences 
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A1) were added to the study to further establish a more direct 
association between high DMN activations during low cognitive 
demand and MW.
This strategy yields results which correspond well with theoreti-
cal accounts of MW as well as with the lay intuition that MW is 
the “default” mental state when the mind is free to engage in it. In 
addition to its intuitiveness, and thus its simplicity, the advantage of 
this strategy is in its robustness: it was found to be replicated across 
virtually any behavioral task tested (Shulman et al., 1997; Mazoyer 
et al., 2001; Wicker et al., 2003), which makes it accessible and 
easy to implement. It should be taken into account, however, that 
executive functioning and MW are probably not as anti-correlated 
as these studies may depict. MW may involve executive processes 
like memory, planning, computing, etc., as is reflected by findings of 
executive networks co-activated with DMN during MW (Christoff 
et al., 2009). Thus, rather than assuming mutual exclusiveness, the 
degree and direction of the association between neural activity of 
the DMN and of executive networks during MW should be studied 
in greater experimental resolution.
Strategy B3: paradigm-free analysis of neuronal dynamics
Brain activity is combined of activations of neurons which comprise 
anatomical and functional networks. Recent advances in functional 
and computational neuroimaging have provided new tools for 
examining functional interactions between time series of signals 
obtained from different brain regions, catalyzing the examination 
of functional connectivity in the resting brain. This type of analy-
sis does not require a behavioral paradigm (“paradigm-free”) and 
indeed is often implemented on data acquired solely when sub-
jects lie resting in the imaging device (the validity of these signals 
is discussed in Box 1). In fMRI, analysis methods of the resting-
state signal can typically be placed into hypothesis dependent and 
hypothesis free methods (Van Den Heuvel and Hulshoff Pol, 2010), 
both resulting in connectivity maps – whether correlational or anti-
correlational (Uddin et al., 2009). These maps demonstrate ana-
tomical networks which, interestingly, greatly overlap with known 
functional neural networks. The DMN is one of those emerging 
networks and thus its relation to MW can be further characterized 
in terms of functional connectivity.
Two studies are brought here to exemplify the usage of a para-
digm-free strategy in further characterizing the relation between 
MW and DMN spatio-temporal dynamics. Horovitz et al. (2008) 
utilized this strategy to determine whether DMN activity can be 
de-coupled from conscious awareness. In this study, the level of 
functional connectivity within the DMN persisted both during 
the resting state and during light sleep. The authors conclude that 
DMN connectivity “does not require or reflect the level of con-
sciousness that is typical for wakefulness” (p. 679), which seems to 
undermine the idea of a functional involvement of DMN activity 
in MW. Nevertheless, two alternative explanations are offered by 
the authors: the first is that these results only decouple wakeful 
awareness from the degree of connectivity within the DMN, but 
not from the amplitude of its activity; the other is that light sleep 
is sometimes characterized by the existence of dream-like reverie 
activity (a mental activity similar to MW) which like MW may also 
be a functional product of DMN activity.
Though not the first to suggest a relation between rest-related 
neural activity and MW, the first paper to specifically associate MW 
with DMN activity was published by Gusnard et al. (2001), as part 
of a series of publications (Raichle et al., 2001) introducing the 
concept of the DMN. In this fMRI study, neural activations dur-
ing rest were compared both to a subjective, emotional judgment 
task (“internally cued condition”) and to a neutral judgment task 
(“externally cued condition”). In accordance with the above pre-
diction, neural activations in DMN-related PFC areas were found 
to be more similar to the activations at rest during the internally 
cued condition than during the externally cued condition (see 
Table 1 for summarized results). Paradigms similar in contrasting 
a self-related task with a similar non-self-related task can be found 
in additional fMRI studies (Johnson et al., 2002; Goldberg et al., 
2006; Schneider et al., 2008; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010), and in 
the PET study described earlier (D’Argembeau et al., 2005). Results 
in all of these studies indicate greater activations (or lesser de-
activations) in brain areas associated with the DMN, mostly MPFC 
areas, during self-related tasks than during non-self-related tasks, 
when compared to rest. These elevated activations were shown to 
last beyond the duration of the stimuli and into the rest period 
following stimulation (Schneider et al., 2008). The majority of 
these papers (except for Johnson et al., 2002) demonstrate that 
DMN activations during self-related conditions were more similar 
to DMN rest-related activity patterns, and suggest that this result 
might imply a possible functional role of rest-related DMN activa-
tions in spontaneous self-related mental activity.
As shown in separate studies as well as in convergence, this is a 
useful strategy for investigating the functional role of areas within 
the DMN while staying within the boundaries of accepted neuro-
imaging paradigms. One drawback of this strategy is the potential 
of over stretching the concept of self, which may cause confound-
ing the self-relatedness of a task with other characteristics like its 
emotional valence (e.g., Gusnard et al., 2001). Therefore, one should 
pay special attention that the parameter modulated between study 
conditions is indeed as specific to self-relatedness as possible.
Strategy B2: parametric modulation of cognitive load
The distinction of ongoing spontaneous mentation from other, task 
related, mental functions dates back to James (1892), and has been 
recognized almost solely by theoretical psychology and philosophy 
over the years (Gallagher, 2000). However, this very classification 
of MW as the mental function characterizing the un-engagement 
of attentional resources directly magnifies its potential to be sci-
entifically explored.
The strategy of parametric modulation of cognitive load has 
been used in the context of studying the functionality of rest-
related DMN activity. In this strategy, the contrast of interest when 
analyzing imaging data is not the commonly used task minus rest 
contrast, but rather the contrast of rest minus task. Researchers 
try to demonstrate that the lower the cognitive load in a given 
task condition, the higher the activations in DMN areas during 
this task, leading to a smaller difference between DMN activations 
during the task compared to rest. Indeed, this was found to be the 
case in fMRI studies such as McKiernan et al. (2006), Christoff 
et al. (2004), and Mason et al. (2007), and in Wicker et al.’s (2003) 
meta-analysis of PET studies. In the case of McKiernan et al. (2006) 
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examination of MW, overviewing the neuroscience of MW so far 
provides a few insights into this neural and mental process.
functIonalIty of MInd-wanderIng
The robustness of the experience of MW across ages, cultures, and 
individuals (Singer and McCraven, 1961), suggests it holds a vital 
role in human psychology. As to the specific role of MW, we sug-
gest several ideas based on current literature which may inspire 
future research.
MW serves “self” functions
As detailed in the context of strategy B1, there are theoretical 
(Gallagher, 2000), neuroanatomical (Gusnard, 2005; Northoff 
et al., 2006), and intuitive grounds to claim that MW is a self-
related cognitive function, which serves to create and maintain 
an integrated, meaningful sense of self out of various aspects of 
self-related information and cognition. Northoff et al. (2006), for 
instance, conceptualizes MW as a “psychological baseline,” a form 
of continuous self-referential processing which is evident during 
non-task conditions and which ultimately forms our subjective 
experience of a “continuous stream of subjective experience” or 
“phenomenal time” where past, present, and future are no longer 
divided but integrated.
MW enables the projection of a “self” to past and future events
The idea that MW serves processes of future planning and simula-
tion is based on theory and common experience, and is strongly 
supported by the fact that the DMN includes areas such as the 
posterior cingulate cortex, the precuneus, and the hippocampus, 
which are known to take part in such mental processes (Buckner 
et al., 2008). Behaviorally, it has been shown that the contents of 
MW will tend toward prospecting or retrospecting according to 
the self relevance of a given context (Smallwood et al., 2009), sug-
gesting that MW serves to integrate past and present experiences 
for the purpose of future planning. Moreover, Smallwood et al. 
(2011b) suggest that self reflection associated with future-oriented 
thinking is an integral part of the autobiographical memory sys-
tem. Interestingly, temporal locus of MW has even been shown 
Another study by the same group (Horovitz et al., 2009) 
  demonstrated altered correlations between DMN network com-
ponents during different states of consciousness, most notably a 
reduced involvement of the MPFC during sleep. The authors sug-
gest that among the DMN components, the frontal cortex may 
play an important role in the sustenance of conscious awareness.
In favor of this strategy, it can be claimed that as some indica-
tion exists for the effect of previous task performance on neural 
activity at subsequent rest (Northoff et al., 2010), a paradigm-free 
study design which consists of rest alone will produce results which 
are more unbiased. In any case, studies of this strategy call atten-
tion to the fact that beyond relative degree of neural activity, more 
holistic parameters of neural dynamics need to be explored to truly 
characterize the DMN–MW relation, such as temporal and spatial 
patterns of DMN activity.
dIScuSSIon and future dIrectIonS
In this review we portray the evolvement of the neuroscience of 
MW, in hope to lay the grounds for additional research to come. 
Undoubtfully, studies like the ones overviewed here serve to nar-
row the gap between theoretical understanding of MW and its 
scientific exploration. Nevertheless, MW is still by large a mystery, 
and much work remains to complete the puzzle. In Box 2 we put 
forward several ideas which stem from existing findings in hope 
of contributing to future research.
Mind-wandering can be studied under different contexts 
involving a wide array of experimental questions. Accordingly, as 
we tried to exemplify in this review, there is no absolute optimal 
way to study it, but rather it is important to make an informed, 
educated choice when studying it within a neuroimaging para-
digm. For instance, MW sampling provides valuable information 
about inter-subject and intra-subject differences in the degree 
of MW, while sacrificing the integrity of its natural, untouched 
flow; In contrast parametric modulation of cognitive load does 
not interfere with the natural course of MW and also enables 
statistical analysis of inter-group variance, with the compromise 
of MW being only implied, and not directly measured. Figure 2 
depicts a flow chart of relevant considerations in making the 
most advantageous choice for a given experimental setup.
The neuronal basis of spontaneous resting-state fMRI signals was 
initially regarded by skeptics as problematic, potentially representing 
merely unknown parameters of noise as well as known physiological 
ones. However recent observations increasingly support and validate 
the neuronal basis of resting-state fMRI signals (Adapted from Van 
Den Heuvel and Hulshoff Pol, 2010):
•	 The	first	and	probably	most	compelling	evidence	for	the	
resting-state signal is that most resting-state patterns tend 
to occur between brain regions overlapping in known fun-
ctional and neuroanatomical regions (Salvador et al., 2005; 
Damoiseaux et al., 2006; Van Den Heuvel et al., 2008).
•	 The	 second	 observation	 relates	 to	 the	 frequency	 of	 rest-	
related signals revealing that the observed spontaneous 
BOLD signals are mainly dominated by lower frequen-
cies (<0.1 Hz) with only a minimal contribution of higher 
frequency cardiac and respiratory oscillations (>0.3 Hz) 
(Cordes et al., 2000, 2001).
•	 Lastly,	 an	 (indirect)	 association	 exists	 between	 the	 fre-
quency profiles of slow spontaneous resting-state fMRI 
and electrophysiological recordings of neuronal firing 
(Nir et al., 2008) and between spontaneous BOLD fluc-
tuations and simultaneous measured fluctuations in neu-
ronal spiking (Shmuel et al., 2002; Shmuel and Leopold, 
2008).
Altogether these findings advocate toward the validity of the neu-
ral signal acquired during the resting state and the legitimacy of its 
scientific exploration.
Box 1 | Validation of spontaneous BoLD fluctuations acquired during rest.
Gruberger et al.  Toward a neuroscience of MW
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  June 2011  | Volume 5  |  Article 56  |  6Understanding MW using brain imaging techniques holds a promise 
for this field of research. Listed here are a few lines of thought that 
could constitute an initial framework for future MW studies:
A.  Temporal patterns of MW: What are the spatio-temporal 
dynamics which correspond to MW in the human brain? 
How are they represented in terms of brain connectivity?
B.  Control of MW: what is MW’s locus of control in the brain? 
Do internal and external abruptions of MW result in simi-
lar neural outcome? Interfering with MW occurrence by 
different type of tasks (e.g., tasks which require external vs. 
internal attention) could offer preliminary answers.
C.  MW and consciousness: What is the nature of the relationship 
between consciousness and MW? Is MW simply an expression 
of conscious experience much like an actor on a stage or is it a 
substantial part of consciousness giving rise to the stage itself? 
If MW is indeed a substantial part of conscious experience one 
would expect similar neural correlates of both phenomena.
D.  MW and pathologies: Which functions does MW serve and 
how are they disrupted when MW does not occur? Both 
the very mechanism and the contents of MW are of great 
i  nterest to clinical psychology and psychiatry. Psychiatric 
and neuronal pathologies associated with MW malfunctio-
ning may shed light on understanding the role of MW in 
healthy psychological functioning.
E.  The contents of MW: In this review we put little empha-
sis on the ever changing contents of MW. This is not to 
say that they are of no importance, only that the studies 
described here were interested in the common mecha-
nism underlying this changing flow of contents. Future 
research might very well attempt to segregate neural 
patterns during MW which are responsible for the expe-
rience of different contents or even different time direc-
tions (e.g., future or past) as explored by Smallwood et al. 
(2009).
To begin answering such questions, the scientific community must 
agree upon theoretical definitions as well as normalized, standardized 
behavioral measures of MW. In the functional neuroimaging field one 
also needs advanced validated computational methods for studying 
the temporal dynamics of neural activations in long sequences such 
as common in rest.
Box 2 | Mind-wandering: questions for future research.
to be related to the direction of apparent physical movement 
through space (forward/backward), implying a functional link 
between MW temporality and sensory spatio-temporal input 
(Miles et al., 2010).
FIguRe 2 | Flowchart of goodness of fit of different strategies according to study aims. A flowchart which may assist researchers wishing to explore 
mind-wandering using functional neuroimaging paradigms. According to study aims one should decide on the appropriate strategy taking into consideration 
advantages and disadvantages of each strategy as discussed in the text.
Altogether, this idea corresponds well with Tulving’s idea of 
“autonoetic consciousness,” which is claimed to be selective to the 
human kind and which enables mentally traveling into the past 
and the future (Tulving, 2005).
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MInd-wanderIng: the neural baSIS of ItS IntegratIon and 
SegregatIon
Portraying the results of the overviewed studies suggests that 
MW involves activities in distributed brain areas (see Table 1 and 
Table A1 in Appendix). These findings of different activations 
might underlie specific aspects of the MW process and in turn 
may serve to deconstruct MW, both theoretically and operation-
ally, into elements according to its content or to the additional 
mental functions which are involved in it (e.g., emotion, auto-
biographical memory, mental time traveling, etc.). Examining the 
different DMN activations according to strategy, as illustrated 
in Figure 1, implies that some sub-areas within the DMN are 
common to MW in any context while others are more typically 
unique to a specific strategy. For example, on an impressionist 
level only, it could be suggested that across strategies lateral cor-
relates of MW are found more dominantly in the left than in the 
right hemisphere and can be commonly regarded as part of the 
network associated with high-level semantic processing. However 
other correlates of MW do differ between strategies, with the 
ventral MPFC and precuneus more sensitive to modulation of 
cognitive load, and dorso-medial MPFC areas more sensitive to 
self-relatedness.
It is of no doubt that such impressions require a compre-
hensive quantitative meta-analysis which is beyond the scope of 
this review. Nevertheless, such a neuro-functional differentia-
tion implies that each strategy might reveal, in addition to the 
network underlying MW, the neural basis of a specific aspect 
within the large construct of MW. A functionally based decon-
struction of the DMN has already been suggested (Spreng et al., 
2009; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Stawarczyk et al., 2011) and 
could prove fruitful for further scientific examination of MW; 
Similar MW studies utilizing such refined and specific definitions 
may shed additional light on differential neural processes which 
underlie diverse aspects of MW.
concludIng reMarkS
Mind-wandering is a universal phenomenon which accompanies 
much of our daily lives from childhood to adulthood. Its explora-
tion has a vast potential in leading us to a better and more profound 
understanding of our ongoing mental selves, and in fact, of the 
basic properties of conscious experience.
The study of MW is at an exciting position of forming into a 
field of research of its own. Its relevance to a wide array of dis-
ciplines, from neuroscience to philosophy to the clinical world 
ensures that it will draw a growing number of researchers in the 
near future. We hope that this review serves to set the milestones 
for a better scientific understanding of this remarkable, unique 
human quality.
MW serves as a learning and consolidation mechanism by 
augmenting the associative abilities of the brain
According to this proposition, spontaneous mental processing 
during wakefulness resembles in its function, in its effects and, 
to a certain extent, in its neural basis, the off-line processing that 
occurs during sleep. This relatively recent idea is presented by con-
temporary writers (Christoff et al., 2008; Baars, 2010) and already 
takes into account what is known about DMN activation patterns. 
According to this notion, it could be suggested that task perfor-
mance would improve following MW in a similar way when fol-
lowing sleep (Stickgold et al., 2001).
MInd-wanderIng-executIve functIonIng relatIon: an 
IntegratIve approach
Converging results from studies like the ones overviewed here 
provide verification for a strong negative association between MW 
and executive functioning. This association, mentioned earlier to 
be part of the rational for strategy B2 (Parametric modulation 
of cognitive load), is supported by behavioral as well as neuro-
scientific evidence (e.g., DMN activity). In light of the infancy 
of MW research, this in itself is a highly   instrumental insight.
Nevertheless, recent lines of evidence suggest that this associa-
tion is not exclusive. The first is found in the activation of executive 
prefrontal and parietal brain areas, in addition to DMN areas, as 
contributing to MW (Christoff et al., 2009). The second is found 
in the gradual increase of DMN activity found in strategies B1 
and B2 as cognitive load decreases and self-relatedness increases, 
which suggests that some DMN activity did occur even in lower 
self relevance or higher cognitive load conditions. The third line of 
evidence is brought by studies which show involvement of DMN 
areas during online task performance (Assaf et al., 2009).
Though assuming a dichotomy between MW and “executive” 
neural networks proved useful for the beginning of MW research, 
a more mature approach might suggest studying the interplay 
between MW and executive functions and their underlying neu-
ral mechanisms (Smallwood and Schooler, 2006). In consistence 
with this line of thought, Spreng et al. (2010) suggest that a third 
anatomically interposed “frontoparietal control network” mediates 
planning across domains, flexibly coupling with either the default 
or dorsal attention network in support of internally vs. externally 
focused cognition, respectively.
Rather than eliminating them, MW probably serves various 
cognitive functions such as prospective planning, self monitoring, 
etc. (Baars, 2010). A better understanding of the interplay between 
MW and executive functioning can be achieved by further imple-
mentation of the five strategies defined here, in turn contributing 
altogether to the understanding of the adaptive value of MW with 
respect to human cognition and affect.
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Table A1 | A summary of overviewed studies and their non-DMN-related results.
Strategy/study  Brain region/BA
  Frontal cortex   occipital  Temporal cortex   Sub 
   cortex    cortical
  Motor areas  Broca’s area  Primary  Temporal  LTC  MTC  Insula 
      visual areas  pole
  6, 4  44, 45  17 , 18, 19  38  41, 21, 20  35, 36, 29 
A1. Real time MW sampling
  Christoff et al. (2009), PNAS  R L   R  + L  R + L    L
  Stawarczyk et al. (2011), Plos One L        L 
A2. Retrospective evaluation of MW  Specific coordinates not reported
B1. Parametric modulation of self-relatedness   
  Gusnard et al. (2001), PNAS           
  Johnson et al. (2002), Brain          R  + L 
  Goldberg et al. (2006), Neuron R  + L  R +  L       R  + L
  Andrews-Hanna et al. (2010), Neuron       R  + L  R + L   
  D’Argembeau et al. (2005), Neuroimage           
  Schneider et al. (2008), Neuroscience           L
B2. Parametric modulation of cognitive load
  Wicker et al. (2003), Brain Res. Rev.           
  Christoff et al. (2004), Cortex  L   R  + L  L    R + L  L
  McKiernan et al. (2006), Neuroimage     L    L  L 
  Mason et al. (2007), Science   R    L    R + L  L  R + L
B3. Data analysis of neuronal dynamics  Specific coordinates not reported
This table depicts overviewed studies sorted by strategy and their non-DMN-related results. Areas were chosen only if evident in more than one of the presented 
studies. Numbers represent Brodmann areas. LTC, lateral temporal cortex; MTC, medial temporal cortex.
Table A2 | Study variables according to strategy.
Strategy   Independent variable  Dependent variable  Contrast of interest
A1. Real-time MW sampling  State (task vs. rest)  Behavioral measures  Rest vs. task
A2. Retrospective evaluation of MW  State (task vs. rest)  Behavioral measures  Rest vs. self
B1. Parametric modulation of self-relatedness  Degree of self-relatedness  Degree of neural activation  Self-related vs. non-self-related task
B2. Parametric modulation of cognitive load  Degree of cognitive load  Degree of neural activation  Rest vs. task
B3. Paradigm-free analysis of neuronal dynamics  State of consciousness  Degree of functional connectivity  Conscious state x vs. conscious state y
This table summarizes typical independent and dependent variables, as well as contrast of interest (relevant to neuroimaging analysis) in each of the five strategies.
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